Supper Club:

Professor Jan Narveson rejects both natural rights theory and utilitarianism and instead builds his argument for libertarianism principles on contractarian foundations.

Narveson, a professor of Philosophy at the University of Waterloo and author of The Libertarian Idea, brought his contractarian message to GVLA members at the March 9th Supper Club in Richmond, BC.

Narveson disagrees with notions of inherent natural rights or natural moral claims. "Where do these rights come from?", he asks. Narveson takes the position that natural rights proponents cannot provide a strong answer as to how or why natural rights arise or why these rights must be respected. Narveson therefore rejects the natural rights position as a weak foundation for libertarianism.

Narveson utilizes the contractarian approach to derive the fundamental moral rules - which would include the libertarian non-aggression axiom - that should govern society. Building on the work of philosophers like David Gauthier, Narveson explains why rational individuals would accept and obey moral rules that have the effect of restricting their own choice and action.

According to Narveson, individuals understand that they are capable of making life difficult for one another. Therefore they realize that in adopting a mutual advantageous agreement (i.e. you don't kill me, I don't kill you) all individuals would ultimately be better off in their quest of achieving their own needs and desires. Under these mutually advantageous agreements or bargains, an individual would not have to spend precious resources on defending his liberty and property and could live in peaceful cooperation with his neighbour to the mutual benefit of both parties. For Narveson, while violating the liberty and property of one's neighbour is not inherently wrong, members of society benefit by agreeing to mutually advantageous agreements that define such action as "wrong".

These bargains or contracts (ergo "contractarianism") that individuals would enter into for mutual advantage would, according to Narveson, generate rules that provide the fundamental moral code that should govern society. Therefore contractarian arrangements arise as individuals rationally develop and formulate fundamental moral rules for interaction between each other. The actual specifics or content of the rules (i.e. what rules would we agree to for mutual advantage?) arise from the bargaining and it is the content of these rules that makes Narveson such a fascinating thinker for libertarians. While contractarian philosophers need not be and in most cases are not libertarians, Narveson advances the position that the content of the bargains that individuals would agree to would be libertarian - i.e. each individual would agree to the non-aggression axiom because it would serve to protect his own property and liberty from others while at the same time constraining him as little as possible from pursing his own life projects and desires.

Hence the essence of Narveson's libertarianism: libertarian rules like the non-aggression axiom are rationally developed and adhered to by individuals for their mutual benefit. These rules are not a logical extension of the notion that individuals are born with or have certain natural or inherent rights but rather they are the product of rational calculations of mutual advantage.

In the question and answer period that followed his speech, Narveson said that presenting the contractarian argument is the most effective way to achieve a libertarian society in which the non-aggression axiom is the rule. According to Narveson, it is simply easier to convince others that although no one individual has any natural or inherent duty to anyone else, all individuals would be better off if each person adhered to certain fundamental moral rules (i.e. the non-aggression axiom) than attempting to convince others that they must restrict certain actions because individuals have certain inherent natural rights.

Narveson also made it clear that the contractarian view should not be confused with utilitarian view, which effectively argues that actions are right if they promote the maximum net general utility. The major problem with utilitarianism, Narveson says, is that it can produce rules which result in gross discrepancies because it only measures aggregates and ignores the effect on individuals. Given that individuals are rational, it is irrational for individuals to abide by rules which do not leave them in a better position than if they did not abide by the rules - yet utilitarianism can lead to such a perverse result.

Questioned as to which philosophers libertarians should read, Narveson answered that libertarians would benefit from reading great philosophers like Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Emmanual Kant. Narveson also noted that libertarians would find useful libertarian arguments in the works of such thinkers. Questioned about novelist-philosopher Ayn Rand, Narveson stated that Rand was not much of a philosopher. In so doing, Narveson added more food for thought to the informal debate raging for years within libertarian circles between people like libertarian philosopher John Hospers who feels that Rand was an important philosopher and others including the libertarian intellectual historian Ronald Hamowy who believes she was quite mediocre.

Although Narveson was critical of the natural rights view, some GVLA members wondered aloud whether Narveson's contractarian view was truly significantly different from the natural rights position. These members noted that many natural rights proponents do not, as Narveson suggested, simply state that natural rights "grow on trees" but rather they develop a convincing case for natural rights just as Narveson develops a strong argument for contractarianism.

For example, Murray Rothbard, a natural rights proponent, develops the case for natural rights (see For a New Liberty, pages 26 to 37) based on a priori arguments which are not significantly different from the arguments Narveson presents as to why individuals rationally develop contractarian arrangements. Narveson concludes that each individual will agree to the non-aggression axiom because it would serve to protect his own property and liberty from others while at the same time constraining him as little as possible from pursing his own life projects and desires. Rothbard concludes that each person has the right to self-ownership because it "gives man the right to perform these vital activities [i.e. to pursue his own projects and desires] without being hampered and restricted by coercive molestation". While Rothbard's logic leads him to derive and explain the need for fundamental moral rules which he terms natural rights, his method might not be significantly dissimilar to Narveson's approach which emphasizes that individuals realize they are ultimate threats to each other and therefore that is why individuals might formulate and abide by certain rules which Narveson terms as fundamental moral rules.

In the end, Narveson's speech stimulated a lot of thought. Most philosophy in the libertarian tradition (i.e. Nozick, Rand and Rothbard) emphasizes natural rights while others (i.e. Mises, and David and Milton Friedman) adopt the utilitarian approach. Thus, for many who attended the Narveson speech it was their first introduction to the contractarian view. Those interested in a complete and detailed description of Narveson's contractarian view should read either Narveson's contribution in Liberty for the Twenty-First Century: Contemporary Libertarian Thought, which is a new book edited by Tibor R. Machan and Douglas Rasmussen and available from Laissez Faire Books (1 800-326-0996), or Narveson's own book, The Libertarian Idea, which is also available from Laissez Faire Books.

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