THE INSIDE STORY ON THE SOMALI CONFLICT
By Michael van Notten, ISIL Advisory Board Member and 
Correspondent, Somalia

BACKGROUND
In June 1991, the General Assembly of the United Somali Congress (USC)
elected its chairman from between two candidates: Aideed and a side-kick
of Ali Mahdi. Aideed received 2/3 of the vote, yet Ali Mahdi refused
to step down as the self-appointed USC President of the Republic of
Somalia.
	Four months earlier, Aideed had warned Ali Mahdi that the Somali
people would never accept his presidency if he appointed himself to
the office. Now he warned Ali Mahdi that he had also been rejected
by his political party. He added, that he, Aideed, would never use
force to depose Ali Mahdi.
	In October 1991, Ali Mahdi had finally formed a government 
numbering
80 ministers, each one more incompetent than the other. Immediately
the Italian government promised massive financial support. That is
where Aideeds patience ran out. He declared that his faction of the
USC was the only legitimate government of the area. Ali Mahdi reacted
by declaring war on Aideed.
	Ali Mahdis attack caused only material damage. Aideeds 
counter-attack
defeated Ali Mahdi quickly. All the territory left to him was the
tiny part of Mogadishu inhabited by his own tribesmen. Aideed could
easily have captured that part as well, but why bother? The war had
served its purpose. Ali Mahdis clan had vacated the government center,
his ministers had all fled and his troops had lost their supply lines.
	Rather than destroying the remnants of his cousins army (Ali Mahdi
is related to Aideed), Aideed used the following six months to expell
from Southern Somalia the army of Somalias former dictator, Syad
Barre. This army had proved to be a big nuisance, robbing friend and
foe alike and causing wide-spread famine.
Defining The Somali Problem	
Outsiders believe that the problem is about who should rule. In reality
it is about how Somalia should be ruled. Ali Mahdi seeks an Italian
type of democracy, Aideed a return to traditional, tribal government;
to kritarchy. Democracy hinges on the rule of law, kritarchy on the
rule of human rights. Democracy works by majority rule; kritarchy
by consensus.
	Aideeds point of view is presently prevailing. The facts speak for
themselves. On March 30th, 1993 the four tribes in Somalias North
West established an independent tribal republic based on their traditional
constitution, the Xeer (pronounced hair). Following, June 4th, the
Majerteen and Hawiye clans of the North East and Center also concluded
peace and agreed to return to the Xeer. The following August 9th,
nine Somali clans in Eastern Ethiopia sent home the democratic autonomous
government given to them by the Ethiopians. The new office holders,
inclined towards kritarchy, promised subordination to the tribal leaders.
In dozens of villages suffering from constant violent conflict, peace
returned, peace based on the Xeer. Meanwhile Aideed was elected as
a traditional leader of his own Hawiye/Habar Ghirir/Saad clan.
The United Nations
A few months after the conflict between Aideed and Ali Mahdi had been
settled, the UN opened an office in Mogadishu and offered to mediate.
Pretty soon, UN Res. Rep. Mohamed Sahnoun realized that the UN had
come too late for this. Therefore he concentrated on reducing the
famine in the South and helping local governments to combat the bandits.
The UN Secretary General, however, was seeking a more spectacular
role for his organization. He fired Sahnoun just when the local governments
were gradually getting things under control. Sahnouns successors
declared that Somalia was an anarchy. They asserted that Aideed was
no longer head of a legitimate government but was a bandit. The Somali
problem was defined as an excess of arms. Their solution was full
disarmament. They said that the UN was the only organization that
could implement this policy. Thus, the stage was set for a UN trusteeship
over Somalia, including military occupation. Those observers who pointed
to the many places where peace reigned despite the presence of numerous
arms, both light and heavy, were ignored, just as their view that
the famine in Baidoa didnt call for the occupation of all of Somalia.

THE RESULT
Over the past ten months, the UN has been spending over three million
US dollars per day in Somalia. It bought: chaos, destruction and thousands
of Somalis killed or wounded by UN guns and UN bombs. All economic
development and nearly all humanitarian activity has stopped. Despite
this failure, the UN is digging in, dragging along the USA, whose
special troops have been instructed to stay until the return of .
. . law and order. Meant are: martial law and martial order, imposed
by . . . foreigners. The Somalis want customary law and tribal order.
That is why the conflict is getting bigger every day.
	The Somalis have now declared war on the UN. The six largest tribes
have pledged 10,000 troops each to expell the American troops. Already
in June, UNOSom troops in Bosaso were told to leave the North East.
On September 10, 1993 UNO-Som officials were expelled from the North
West which seceded from Somalia in March 1993 because of UNO-Soms
imperialist policies.

THE UN FAILURE
Many mistakes were made . . .
** The UN lied to the Somalis. It asked Aideeds permission to fight
those bandits who were impeding the relief operations. Upon arrival,
the UN started to rule Somalia.
** The UN pontificated that Somalia was without government. In reality
it has many governments, some aristocratic, some democratic and some
tribal, with a general trend towards tribal.
** The UN ignores the fact that tribal government is more effective and
efficient and also more just than the national government the UN is
trying to impose upon the Somalis. Indeed, the Somalis perceive UNO-Som
(and most other foreigners) as savages.
** The UN let itself be guided by its perceived might, rather than what
is right.
** The UN ignored the fact that most Somalis forget their mutual 
differences
when the survival of their nation is at stake. Indeed, all UN efforts
to play off one clan against another proved to be counter-productive.
** The UN thought that the Somali soldiers are being commanded by Aideed.
In actual fact, Somali soldiers dont take orders; they dont get
paid either. Every soldier is his own general, defending his freedom
and tribal culture as he sees fit.
** The UN reopened a conflict that had been closed. It sided with the
loser, Ali Mahdi, an ignorant urban man without roots in rural Somalia,
where 90% of the nation lives.
** The UN played up the importance of democratic parties when Somalia
was rapidly becoming tribal again. In tribal society, politics is
decided by the odayasha, the elected judges.
** The UN didnt understand that when the Somalis say democracy they
mean tribal government based on the Xeer, which stipulates government
by judges. Traditional Somali society centers on timeless, unchangeable
and universal human rights rather than on ever-changing government
laws.
** The UN constantly referred to Somalias inability to govern itself,
ignoring the fact that foreign governments kept Somalias dictator
Syad Barre in power long after his rejection by the Somali population
and that foreign governments prevented Somalias liberator, Aideed,
from forming the first post-dictatorial government.
** The UN listens primarily to Somalis who belong to either the democratic
dreamers of the 1960s or the corrupt followers of Somalias dictator
Syad Barre during the 1970s and 80s.
** The UN seems to ignore that every Somali is always ready to defend
his human right to keep and bear arms.

Upon its arrival in Mogadishu, the UN stopped the local police militias
from protecting the foreign humanitarian organizations, claiming that
it could do so more efficiently. In this way, the UN made thousands
of Somalis jobless until . . . they started robbing the foreigners.
The UN judges killings wrongly. When it kills hundreds of Somali citizens
it regrets that it had to be done. When a handful of UN soldiers
are killed, it cries murder. In reality, in times of war, killing
soldiers is no crime. Killing civilians, on the contrary is plain
murder.

WHAT NEXT?
All foreign government agencies should leave Somalia without delay
because gradualism would be a new source of conflicts. Foreign governments
need not maintain even embassies, only consulates. Humanitarian assistance
and economic development is best left to non-governmental organizations.
In fact, the longer UNO-Som clings to Somalia, the more difficult
it will be, after its departure, to put that country together again.
US Defense Minister Les Aspin predicts that Somalia will revert to
famine and political chaos upon US withdrawal. Such events are not
likely to return, however, especially not when the indigenous police
forces are strengthened, particularly those belonging to the tribal
alliance SNA. UNO-Som is least qualified to undertake this job, given
its history of meddling in tribal politics and the fact that its hands
are dripping with Somali blood. Best qualified for this job would
be private security agencies, such as the British SECURICOR.
The Somali chaos is of two kinds. First the chaos of 1991-92, when
Ali Mahdi, helped by a foreign government, tried to impose democracy.
This chaos was prolonged when former dictator Syad Barre, helped by
another foreign government, occupied the South and marched on Mogadishu.
All tribes now agree that such chaos can be avoided by having tribal,
instead of central government. And their agreement has been followed
by action. Therefore, there will be no return to chaos upon UNO-Som
withdrawal. Second, there is the political chaos created by UNO-Som.
In hundreds of villages visited by UNO-Som officials, UNO-Som strawmen
are presently engaged in merciless fights with tribal leaders over
the question of who will receive the money UNO-Soms democratic government
will eventually dish out. This chaos must disappear. It will disappear
only after UNO-Som will have withdrawn.
UNO-Som will never understand tribal government. This type of government
prevailed in rural Somalia while the intellectuals were experimenting
with democracy and tyranny in Mogadishu. Tribal government, if left
alone, can deal with any conflict. It does not spell the end of Somalia.
On the contrary, the Somalis became a nation, with one language, one
poetry, one music, one culture, one territory and one religion, precisely
because it had tribal government. The Somalis do not need a common
President or a common executive in order to stick together. Since
time immemorial, they have had a common Bill of Rights and Procedures
(the Xeer) . . . and the common will to enforce them.

CONCLUSION
Somalias main problem is neither banditism nor anarchy. It is that
foreigners are sabotaging the creation of indigenous governments.
The UN is now the main obstacle to a return of law and order. In addition,
it has Somali blood on its hands. Therefore it should leave immediately.
It can do so without regrets, because its mission has not been totally
negative. The UN has united all Somalis; not only against itself,
but also in favor of customary law and tribal order, eventually leading
to a federation of their regional governments.
Borama, Somaliland
September 27, 1993
Michael van Notten
ISIL Correspondent/Somalia
NOTE: Michael van Notten will be a speaker at ISILs World Conference
Merida, Mexico. October 2-7, 1994

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